A tank commander fires his machine gun throughout an advance in the direction of the enemy throughout the Aurora 23 army train on the Rinkaby firing vary exterior Kristianstad, Sweden on Could 06, 2023 – Johna Nilsson/AFP
The broad Russian offensive of February 2022 was a failure: however that failure was as a result of weaknesses of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It needs to be seen in that mild somewhat than a lesson in trendy manoeuvre warfare.
Russian army failure within the subject was right down to 4 components.
Firstly there was overconfidence. Based mostly on the profitable takeover of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, the Russian expectation was for a swift collapse of Ukrainian resistance and a degree of cooperation and collaboration by the Ukrainian inhabitants that will make the “particular army operation” – because the Russians name it – extra of a liberation. That overconfidence was additionally primarily based on a inhabitants estimate of the variety of Russian audio system and an assumption that “in the event that they converse Russian, they have to help us”.
For that cause, the Russian advance was meant to be a mixed all arms operation to swiftly overwhelm the Ukrainians and seize their centre of gravity, the town of Kiev, decapitating the management and making a benign and permissive setting for the Russians to soak up the territory. However issues didn’t play out that method.
The second failure issue was deep ranges of theft and corruption at each degree. The Russian army on paper was a contemporary and doubtlessly efficient machine with some logistic vulnerabilities, however general match for goal. In the actual world, cash spent on offering rations for Russian troops was in reality stolen, and outdated pet food was substituted for top calorific fight rations. Among the cash to purchase tyres for wheeled fight autos was spent on Chinese language knock-offs that perished within the sub-zero temperatures, and the remainder of the price range pocketed. The explosive within the reactive armour on most of the Russian tanks was stolen and changed with sand and within the subject, very important provides and spares have been offered off. As not too long ago as final month a Russian colonel was caught promoting off seven T-90 tank engines.
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The third issue was the sheer incompetence of the Russian army management. Russian operational safety was compromised, and the place the paratroopers and particular forces of the VDV airborne landed they have been ambushed and slaughtered with losses as excessive as 90 per cent.
By feeding of their armoured brigades piecemeal, the Russians offered an excellent goal for the hit and run techniques of the Ukrainians, nicely equipped from early on with handheld NLAW antitank weapons from the UK. This protracted slaughter noticed a lot of Russia’s new class of “kontraktniki” skilled troopers killed, wounded or captured. From then on, poorly educated cannon-fodder changed them within the battle in opposition to an more and more skilled enemy. Mass assaults by armour into nicely sited antitank screens and human wave assaults right into a storm of artillery and small arms fireplace – like one thing from the worst components of WWI – additional depleted the already skinny manpower useful resource.
The fourth issue was logistic failure at each degree. Poor strains of communication meant logistics have been woeful. Tanks ran out of gasoline and have been deserted. Items ran out of meals and easily surrendered. Ammunition was fired off so shortly that shares ran out. Newly manufactured ammunition – which the UK assesses is getting used now – has a failure price of as much as 50 per cent, likely resulting from corner-cutting so that cash might be stolen.
The imminent Ukrainian counter-offensive will probably be a unique story. To start with, the standard of the lads and machines and coaching is superb. There may be by no means sufficient of something however what there may be, is excellent. Ukrainian command, management and techniques have been sharpened by the expertise gained over a yr of struggle.
However we should do not forget that Ukraine is an unlimited nation and it might be unwise to hope for large armoured breakthroughs penetrating deeply into Russian rear areas and rolling their forces up. There are unlikely to be massive sweeping advances. The flexibility of Ukrainian logistics to quickly lengthen provide strains to maintain up with dashing Leopards and Challengers whereas additionally protecting the supporting cell artillery equipped is finite, pricey and topic to battlefield situations.
It could be prudent to handle expectations of the approaching offensive. We usually tend to see vital, environment friendly attrition and erosion of the Russian will and skill to battle, somewhat than any knockout blow.
Nonetheless after we examine the possible Ukrainian offensive this yr with the ill-conceived Russian invasion of February 2022 there’s a large qualitative gulf within the potential for efficiency and success.
Victory will come, however it’s going to take time – and regrettably it’s going to come at some price in blood and treasure.
Colonel Tim Collins is a former British Military officer who served with the SAS and as commander of the Royal Irish throughout the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when his before-battle speech to his troopers made headlines world wide
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